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THE CHOICE-BASED PERSPECTIVE OF CHOICE-
OF-LAW 
SAGI PEARI* 
This Article offers an innovative basis for the choice-of-law question: the 
Choice-Based Perspective (CBP). The main argument is that there exists 
an alternative rights-based understanding of choice-of-law to that which is 
presently known as the “vested rights” theory. This understanding is based 
on the legal philosophy of perhaps the greatest expositor of the rights-
based concept, Immanuel Kant. In contrast to alternative approaches, CPB 
insists on a purely private conception of the subject, grounded on an 
organizing principle of unity of persons’ choices. Furthermore, the 
proposed approach holds much sway in practice, for the normative 
underpinnings of CBP are already embedded in many traditional and 
contemporary choice-of-law rules, doctrines, and concepts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
[C]hoice of law was one of the easiest subjects because there was really 
only one rule for all areas of private law: “You apply the law most 
substantially connected,” he would say with a subtle accent. As a 
student, I felt that was an unhelpful generalization. On other occasions, 
when students were troubled by inconsistencies between implications of 
the established choice of law rule and the outcome of the particular 
cases, he would observe calmly that the courts routinely manipulated the 
rules to produce a just result. I found this frustrating: either the decision 
in question was wrong, or the rule was in need of reformulation, or we 
had failed to appreciate the consistency between the two.1 
 
In the above-quoted passage, contemporary choice-of-law scholar 
Professor Janet Walker expresses concerns about her former choice-of-law 
teacher’s vision of the subject. This vision seems to be grounded on a 
problematic general principle and exception. The general principle refers to 
the somewhat amorphous and highly flexible “most significant relationship 
principle” (“MSR principle”)2  according to which courts apply the law of 
the jurisdiction having “most significant relationship” to the parties and the 
event. The exception seems to refer to some form of better-law approach, 
condemned no less in choice-of-law literature,3 according to which courts 
evaluate the substantive merits of the applied laws. Furthermore, the 
combination of the general principle and the exception lacks internal 
coherency and consistency. 
However, in this Article I argue that the intuitive understanding of 
Professor Walker’s teacher was right. Drawing from Kantian legal 
philosophy4 and several neo-Kantian writings,5 this Article depicts the main 
contours of what I have labeled a Choice-Based Perspective (“CBP”) on 
choice-of-law. I argue that CBP provides a truly individual-rights–based 
 
 1.  Janet Walker, “Are We There Yet?” Towards a New Rule for Choice of Law in Tort, 38 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 331, 332 (2000). 
 2.  See e.g. ALBERT EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 351 (1962) 
(mocking the MSR principle as a “meaningless generalization”); Brainerd Currie, Full Faith and Credit 
Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congres,s SUP. CT. REV. 89, 95 (1964) (mocking the MSR principle as 
showing a “lack of standard”). 
 3.  For extensive criticism pointing to the inherently subjective nature of the best-law approach, 
see e.g. Paul H. Neuhaus, Legal Certainty Versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 795, 802–07 (1963); O. Kahn-Freund, General Problems of Private International Law, 143 
RECUEIL DES COURS 139, 466 (1974). 
 4.  See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor trans & ed.., 
1996) (1797) [hereinafter KANT, DOCTRINE OF RIGHT]; Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A 
Philosophical Sketch, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS (H.B. Nisbet trans., Hans Reiss ed.,1991) (1795). 
 5.  See generally ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995) [hereinafter WEINRIB, 
THE IDEA]; ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM (2009). 
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understanding of the subject that is so lacking in traditional and 
contemporary choice-of-law literature. While other accounts have 
fundamentally grounded their vision on the principle of states’ sovereignty, 
CBP presents a purely private conception of choice-of-law as the union of 
the choices of two persons. 
Furthermore, I argue that CBP is not detached from reality, but in fact 
reflects it. Despite the popular instrumentalist conception of the choice of 
law as a tool for promoting states’ interests,6 the normative underpinnings 
of CBP are already embedded in many traditional and contemporary 
choice-of-law rules, doctrines and concepts of many jurisdictions: (1) the 
above-mentioned and vastly popular MSR principle;7 (2) the universally 
recognized parties’ autonomy principle;8 (3) the flexible  choice-of-law 
connecting factors or “starting points” that have been established for each 
of the private law categories;9 (4) the central concept of “parties’ 
reasonable expectations”;10 and (5) the inherent reference, in various 
doctrines, to the substantive merits of the involved laws in extreme cases.11 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the notion of 
relational choice as an organizing idea of CBP and distinguishes this 
notion from the popular sovereignty principle. Part II elaborates on the 
three foundational blocks of CBP—(1) the Parties’ Autonomy Principle (2) 
the Doctrine of Constructive Inference; and (3) the Innate Right Test of 
Legality—and traces their presence in contemporary and traditional choice-
of-law rules, doctrines, and concepts. Part III provides several examples of 
the operational mechanics of CBP. 
I.  A FRESH START 
It has become axiomatic that the choice-of-law discipline must 
somehow be grounded on the organizing principles of the Law of Nations: 
states’ sovereignty or states’ relationships.12 This notion appears 
throughout the development of choice-of-law thought.13 Choice-of-law 
 
 6.  See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).] 
 7.  See infra notes 47–58 and accompanying text. 
 8.  See infra Part II.A. 
 9.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 10.  See infra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
 11.  See infra Part II.C. 
 12.  See e.g. FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 159–61 (1993). 
For a similar argument regarding the centrality of the sovereignty principle for classical and modern 
choice-of-law methodologies, see Gerhard Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, 112 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 95, 184 (1964); Annelise Riles, Cultural Conflicts, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 278–84 
(2008). 
 13.  For a striking example of this type of historical argument, see Alex Mills, The Private History 
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theorist have invoked the involvement of a foreign element in a private-law 
case as sufficient grounds for insisting on an inherent link between the case 
and states’ involvement. This explains why the recent provocative 
argument regarding the entire public international law foundation of private 
international law has suddenly seemed so reasonable and convincing.14 
Take for the example, the two American leading choice-of-law 
approaches of the last century: Joseph Beale’s version of the vested rights 
theory15 and Brainerd Currie’s interest analysis.16 Grounded on the notion 
that choice-of-law is a tool for advancing states’ interests, interest analysis 
has inherently linked itself to states’ activities. The same is true with 
respect to Beale’s approach. Although it uses the terminology of 
“individual rights,” the central components of this theory were ultimately 
grounded on the principle of states’ sovereignty.17 
CBP, however, offers something completely different. It defends the 
conception under which the choice-of-law question is viewed as purely 
related to the interaction between litigating parties and as providing the 
juridical (as opposed to political) manifestation of this interaction. In this 
way, CBP joins the very few commentators who did not take the 
sovereignty axiom for granted. Gerhard Kegel18 and Friedrich Juenger19 
intuitively challenged the relevance of states’ sovereignty and states’ 
interests in grasping the nature of choice-of-law question. This strictly 
“private” conception of the subject has a rich tradition in the choice-of-law 
literature that for years has refused to open the foundations of choice-of-
law process to the principles of the Law of Nations.20 
So, if choice-of-law process has nothing to do with states’ sovereignty 
and states’ interests, what is choice-of-law about? In a nutshell, the 
normative foundation of CBP follows from the title of the discipline 
itself—it is about relational choice. 
 
of International Law, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (2006). 
 14.  ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009). 
 15.  JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935). For further discussions on 
vested rights theory, see infra notes 17, 91–96 and accompanying text. 
 16.  CURRIE, supra note 6. 
 17.  Thus, Beale insisted on the national conception of the subject according to which the courts 
do not apply the foreign law, but recognize the plaintiff’s right under the domestic law. Accordingly, 
the foreign law is applied under this conception not as a law, but rather as a “fact” and as such, does not 
negate the sovereignty of the forum. BEALE, supra note 15, §5.4, at 53. Furthermore, because of the 
sovereignty principle, Beale insisted that the positive law of the country where the last event took place 
ultimately determines the question of choice-of-law. Id. §§ 4.12, 8A.1, 8A.6, at 45–47, 58, 62–63. 
 18.  Kegel, supra note 12, at 180, 198. 
 19.  JUENGER, supra note 12, at 159–61. 
 20.  See, e.g., C.M.V.CLARKSON & JONATHAN HILL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (4rd ed. 2011); 
ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (1943). 
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The aspect of choice is derived from the Kantian justification of the 
contemporary international order.  Kant viewed independent states with 
public legal institutions as a necessary reflection of the his organizing 
principle of individuals’ freedom.21 Within this order, the question which 
framework applies for determining the rightfulness of individuals’ private 
interaction (whether purely domestic or international) cannot be determined 
by external authority, but rather has to be determined by the individuals 
themselves. The idea is that only by allowing individuals to choose the 
framework can the contemporary international order fully embody and 
cohere with the fundamental Kantian organizing principle of individuals’ 
freedom. 
Consider for example the following set of situations: (1) a contract 
signed in North Carolina between two North Carolina businessmen with 
respect to delivery of goods in North Carolina; (2) a contract signed in 
North Carolina between North Carolina residents with respect to delivery 
of goods in the State of New York; and (3) a contract signed in North 
Carolina between New York residents with respect to delivery of goods in 
California. Given that the court of North Carolina has jurisdiction in these 
cases, does it need conceptually to deal with the question of the identity of 
the applied law in each one of the cases? CBP’s answer to this question is 
“yes.” Although the the foreign element grows more significant in each 
successive case, the CBP regards all three cases as involving the choice-of-
law question. The requirement of choice does not depend on the degree of 
connectedness to the foreign system; rather, it exists as an independent 
normative requirement that is a conceptual precondition to any private-law 
litigation. Accordingly, an adjudication of the parties’ contractual claims in 
the above-mentioned cases has to be subjected to the preliminary choice-
of-law question.22 
 
 21.  KANT, DOCTRINE OF RIGHT, supra note 4, [6:230, 6:313]. Therefore, the Kantian justification 
of public legal institutions is the reverse of traditional thinking. Their existence is not perceived as an 
effective tool for promotion of certain values, but as necessarily following from the organizing principle 
of individuals’ freedom. See also RIPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 8–9, 145–81.  For a  more detailed 
discussion of the Kantian normative justification for contemporary international order, see infra notes 
97–105 and accompanying text. 
 22.  Accordingly, CBP reminds somewhat of the argument made by Larry Kramer. Kramer has 
challenged the conventional wisdom according to which choice-of-law cases should be distinguished 
from purely private law cases by the mere presence of a single foreign element. While using interest 
analysis as a point of departure, Kramer argues that no conceptual difference exists between conflicting 
plaintiff-defendant arguments regarding the ingredients of say tort law liability and the choice-of-law 
question. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 282–83 (1990).  By 
completely equalizing policy-based analyses of domestic and private international law cases, Kramer 
introduced a purely domestic version of choice-of-law. As he claims “[t]he first—and most important—
point to recognize is that moving from wholly domestic cases with multistate contacts does not change 
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The nature of the parties’ choice of which framework under which to 
adjudicate their private dispute sheds light on the centrality of the states 
under CBP. This choice is not abstract; it inherently refers to a specific 
territory and, consequently, the specific positive law that governs this 
territory. Accordingly, states do not disappear under CBP. The contrary is 
true. While they do not play a role in the choice-of-law process itself, 
states’ positive-law provisions serve as the object of the parties’ choice. In 
this way, CBP recognizes the existence of independent states having 
specific territory, territory over which states exercise their sovereign power 
in the form of the states’ positive laws.23 
The choice is also relational. CBP perceives the choice-of-law 
question as not related to a single person’s choice but rather as related to 
the unity of two persons’ choices. This conception of the subject rests on 
Kantian legal philosophy, which insists on the strictly relational character 
of private-law interaction as a relation between two persons, rather than as 
a relation between a person and a thing.24 Based precisely on this relational 
character of private law, contemporary neo-Kantian scholars have 
developed the modern private law categories of contract,25 tort,26 unjust 
enrichment27 and the law of property.28 Since CBP insists on a strictly 
 
the essential nature of the interpretive problem.” Id. at 290. Although Kramer’s argument regarding the 
inherent presence of the choice-of-law question in purely domestic cases requires an independent 
treatment, at first glance, it seems that Kramer confuses the choice-of-law question and the adjudication 
process itself. In contrast to Kramer’s approach, CBP purports to explain why the choice-of-law 
question always (even in purely domestic private law cases) comes first, before the adjudication 
process. 
 23.  This conception of the subject sheds light on one of the perplexing questions of choice-of-law 
scholarship: the question of whether there should be a conceptual distinction between interstate cases 
within federal systems, such as the United States and Canada, and international interaction. See, e.g., 
Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N. Y. U. L. REV. 
719, 729, n.53 (2009); Mathias Reimann, Domestic and International Conflicts Law in the United States 
and Western Europe, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS FOR THE THIRD MILLENNIUM 109 (Patrick 
J. Borchers & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2001). Since choice-of-law is conceptually viewed as addressing the 
question of individuals’ choice with respect to a certain framework to adjudicate their private law 
dispute and the states’ sovereignty principle does not play any normative role – there is no conceptual 
distinction between federal systems and the general rationale of choice-of-law rules. 
 24.  This conception of private law is fundamentally grounded on the contemporary influential 
Neo-Kantian theory of private law of corrective justice, which perceives private law as grounded in the 
bipolar structure between the particular plaintiff and particular defendant. See generally WEINRIB, THE 
IDEA, supra note 5; JULIUS COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE (2001). 
 25.  See generally RIPSTEIN, supra note 5 at 107–45. 
 26.  See generally WEINRIB, THE IDEA, supra note 5, at 101–44. 
 27.  See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, The Normative Structure of Unjust Enrichment, in 
STRUCTURE AND JUSTIFICATION IN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS FOR PETER BIRKS 21 (Charles Rickett and 
Ross Grantham eds., 2008); Sagi Peari, Improperly Collected Taxes: The Border between Private and 
Public Law, 23 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 125 (2010). 
 28.  See generally RIPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 86–107. 
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“private” conception of choice-of-law, it follows this relational structure of 
private interaction. The idea of choice becomes the idea of united choice.29 
Part II elaborates on the three foundational blocks of this idea: (1) the 
Parties’ Autonomy Principle; (2) the Doctrine of Constructive Inference; 
and (3) the Innate Right Test of Legality. 
II. THE THREE FOUNDATIONAL BLOCKS OF CBP 
A. Parties’ Autonomy Principle 
Approaching universal recognition, the so-called parties’ autonomy 
principle provides a starting point for CBP analysis of the choice-of-law 
question. This principle holds that litigating parties have the ability to 
establish the identity of the law applicable for determining their private 
rights and duties. In a rare consensus among legal scholars and judicial 
decisions, the parties’ autonomy principle has long been accepted in the 
area of contract law.30 Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of Laws31 and Article 3 of the European Rome I Regulation32 have 
explicitly incorporated this principle. Furthermore, the parties’ autonomy 
principle has most recently also received significant recognition in the 
areas of tort law and the law of unjust enrichment under Article 14(a) of the 
Rome II Regulation.33 
Despite the general acceptance of the parties’ autonomy principle in 
practice, its theoretical underpinnings remain obscured. More specifically, 
the principle has created at least two riddles for traditional positivistic 
 
 29.  It should be noted that the argument presented in this Article is of limited scope. While  
fundamentally relying on corrective justice’s conception of private law, CBP offers an approach for 
grasping choice-of-law rules for the basic structures of private interaction (contract, tort, unjust 
enrichment, movable property and certain family law interaction) and does not extend its scope to the 
instances of different normative structures (such as criminal law), mixed structures (such as cases of 
environmental torts or issues related to employers’ compensation), and structures that require an 
additional normative argument (such as the case of immovable property). 
 30.  See, e.g., Hessel E. Yntema, Autonomy in Choice-of-Law, 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 345–53 
(1954); Mathias Reimann, Savigny’s Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of the 
Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 571, 575–77 (1999); Patrick J. Borchers, Categorical Exceptions 
to Party Autonomy in Private International Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1646 (2008). 
 31.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §187 (1971). 
 32.  REGULATION (EC) 593/2008 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 17 
JUNE 2008 ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS (ROME I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 
(EU), ART. 3 [hereinafter Rome I Regulation]. 
 33.  COMMISSION REGULATION 864/2007, ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO NON-CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATIONS (ROME II), art. 14, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40 (EC), [hereinafter Rome II Regulation]; Mo 
Zhang, Party Autonomy in Non-Contractual Obligations: Rome II and Its Impacts on Choice of Law, 39 
SETON HALL L. REV. 861, 864 (2009) (calling the parties’ autonomy principle as the “most innovative 
part of Rome II”). 
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thought.34 First, what is the normative justification of the principle? The 
very concept of the sovereign state, whose legislative body enacts positive 
law, seems to be at odds with the idea of enabling the parties to determine 
themselves the framework that will govern their dispute. Joseph Beale 
famously mocked this possibility as no less than “permission to the parties 
to do a legislative act.”35 Secondly, why should parties be permitted to 
choose a framework that is not the positive law of one of the existing states, 
such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. 
The possibility of the application of a non-state norm seems to entail an 
even deeper problem for traditional legal positivism, which by its nature is 
limited to state-made law. 
For CBP, however, the two riddles of legal positivism present no 
difficulty. The very nature of the parties’ autonomy principle embodies 
CBP’s fundamental idea of the parties’ united choice with respect to the 
framework to be applied to resolve their dispute. Thus, the parties’ 
autonomy principle is a paradigmatic case for CBP and follows CPB’s 
normative justification that united choice is always required in private-law 
cases. Furthermore, the relational structure of private-law categories which 
is presupposed by CBP is consistent with the contemporary tendency to 
further extend the parties’ autonomy principle to other private-law 
categories, such as tort law, unjust enrichment,36 and family law.37 
Kantian philosophy justifies the legislative branch as addressing the 
problem of indeterminacy in a hypothetical regime of purely private rights 
lacking public legal institutions.38 Yet, under the parties’ autonomy 
principle the parties explicitly replace the legislative provision with an 
alternative framework despite the theoretical necessity of that framework 
for parties’ autonomy, thus introducing the possibility of adopting non-state 
provisions. CBP resolves the apparent contradiction: it objects to the 
contemporary general tendency to disqualify in advance the possibility of 
 
 34.  See e.g., Matthias Lehmann, Liberating the Individual from the Battles between States: 
Justifying Party Autonomy in Conflict of Laws, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 381, 383 (2008) 
(mentioning the “theoretical headaches to any serious positivist” that the parties’ autonomy principle 
has caused). 
 35.  BEALE, supra note 15, § 332.1, at 1079. 
 36.  See Rome II Regulation, supra note 33. 
 37.  See e.g., Erik Jayme, Parties Autonomy Principle in International Family Law and 
Succession Law: New Tendencies, 11 Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 1 (2009). For further discussion on the 
extension of the parties’ autonomy principle to family law from the Neo-Kantian theoretical 
perspective, see Sagi Peari, Choice-of-Law in Family Law: Kant, Savigny and the Parties’ Autonomy 
Principle, 4 NETH. J. OF PRIVATE INT’L L. 597 (2012). 
 38. KANT, DOCTRINE OF RIGHT, supra note 4, at [6:297, 6:313]; see also Ernest Weinrib, Poverty 
and Property in Kant’s System of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 808-10 (2003) [hereinafter 
Weinrib, System of Rights]. 
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choice of non-state law,39 but at the same time it also imposes a significant 
restriction on such choice. Since the parties’ autonomy principle addresses 
the problem of indeterminacy in the regime of absence of public legal 
institutions, a similar requirement applies with respect to the alternative 
framework. Accordingly, for CBP, this alternative framework has to be just 
as determinative as a comprehensive state regime. Candidates appearing to 
meet this “specificity” requirement include the above-mentioned 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the 
Muslim and Jewish comprehensive private-law traditions that have 
addressed in great detail a wide range of private interactions.40 
While the parties’ autonomy principle is a reflection of choice-of-law 
in its purest form, one may inquire as to the relevance of the argument in 
the vast majority of cases which lack explicit choice of the parties. The 
next section of this Article addresses these cases. Through the introduction 
of the Doctrine of Constructive Inference41 and its three constitutive 
ingredients—(a) juridical imposition, (b) juridical indicators, and (c) 
juridical presuppositions—this section will demonstrate how united choice 
is still possible in such cases. 
 
 39.  For discussion of the difficulty in incorporating non-state norms into the provisions of the 
American Second Restatement, and the Rome I and Rome II Regulations, see Katharina Boele-Woelki, 
Unifying and Harmonizing Substantive Law and The Role of Conflict of Laws, 340 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 275, 401-19 (2010); Giesela Rühl, Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of 
Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence and Economic Efficiency, in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A 
GLOBALIZED WORLD 153, 164-67; Symeon C. Symeonides, Party Autonomy in Rome I and II from a 
Comparative Perspective, in CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – 
LIBER AMICORUM KURT SIEHR 513, 539-40 (Katharina Boele-Woelki et al. eds., 2010). 
 40.  For further elaboration on the “specificity requirement” within a concrete example of Jewish 
law, see infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. This is not, however, to say that the “specificity 
requirement” is the only limitation that CBP imposes on parties’ potential choice. Since the three 
foundational blocks of CBP are normatively interconnected, Part III of this Article will demonstrate 
further limitations on the parties’ autonomy principle as a result of its relation to the Doctrine of 
Constructive Inference (in the form of the “reasonable connection” requirement) and its relation to the 
Innate Right Test of Legality (in the form of a substantive restriction on parties’ potential choice). For 
discussion of these issues, see infra notes 116–19 and accompanying text. 
 41.  The term “constructive inference” is borrowed from Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s work on 
choice-of-law. See FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, AND THE 
LIMITS OF THEIR OPERATION IN RESPECT OF PLACE AND TIME 202 (William Guthrie trans., 1880) 
(1849). On the extensive analysis of this work as a reflection of the complex synthesis and interplay of 
natural rights philosophy, Roman law sources, the historical school of jurisprudence and the principal 
objection to judicial discretion, see Sagi Peari, Savigny’s Theory of Choice-of-Law as a Principle of 
Voluntary Submission, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming 2014). 
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B. The Doctrine of Constructive Inference 
1. Juridical Imposition 
The Doctrine of Constructive Inference is based on one of the central 
notions of Kantian legal philosophy, juridical imposition. Since this 
philosophy focuses on the parties’ external actions rather than on subjective 
beliefs and wishes, judicial impartiality is crucial. For Kant, the judge 
represents a “person that is authorized to impute with rightful force.”42 
Accordingly, contemporary neo-Kantian accounts have emphasized the 
normative necessity of impartial authority, which provides an external 
juridical standpoint to parties’ interactions.43 In the context of CBP, the role 
of judicial authority can be stated as follows: by providing juridical 
meaning to the parties’ actions, the judge imposes on the parties a united 
choice with respect to the positive law governing their private-law 
interaction. 
In choice-of-law literature, the central concept of “reasonable 
expectations of the parties”44 illuminates the notion of juridical imposition. 
For example, in the absence of explicit agreement in the area of contract 
law, English courts have traditionally imposed on the parties a liability 
provision that could be objectively presumed to have been intended by the 
parties to govern the contract.45 CBP, however, does not restrict this 
concept to the contract-law category. Objectively imposing “reasonable 
expectations” on both sides of private-law litigation, CBP reflects the 
relational structure of private-law categories as a nexus between the 
particular plaintiff and defendant. Accordingly, the “reasonable 
expectations” concept flows to the other categories of private law46: 
movable property, tort, unjust enrichment, and family law. 
 
 42.   KANT, DOCTRINE OF RIGHT, supra note 4, at 6:227. 
 43.  See Ernest J. Weinrib, Two Conceptions of Remedies, in JUSTIFYING PRIVATE LAW 
REMEDIES 3, 27 (Charles Rickett ed. 2008); see also Ernest J. Weinrib, Publicness and Private Law, in 
1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL KANT CONGRESS 191, 192 (H. Robinson & Gordon 
Brittan eds., 1995). Many contemporary legal doctrines, such as the objective standard of negligence 
law, incorporate the notion of juridical imposition. For discussion of this point, see WEINRIB, THE IDEA, 
supra note 5, at 177-83. 
 44.  For an argument regarding the primary centrality of this concept in choice-of-law thought, see 
CLARKSON & HILL, supra note 20, at 6-7; Peter E. Nygh, The Reasonable Expectations of the Parties 
as a Guide to the Choice of Law in Contract and in Tort, 251 RECUEIL DES COURS 273, 294-96 (1995). 
 45.  See Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., [1939] A.C. 277 (P.C.) (appeal taken 
from N.S.). As Lord Wright states, “the proper law of the contract ‘is the law which the parties intended 
to apply’. That intention is objectively ascertained, and, if not expressed, will be presumed from the 
terms of the contract and the relevant surrounding circumstances.” Id. at 290; see also ADRIAN BRIGGS, 
AGREEMENT ON JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAW 429-40 (2008). 
 46.  For an argument in this direction, see Nygh, supra note 44. 
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Furthermore, this “parties’ reasonable expectations” concept holds 
much more sway in the choice-of-law landscape than one might think. In 
particular, it bears clear conceptual similarity to the extremely popular 
MSR principle. Under the MSR principle, the courts should seek the law 
that reflects the most significant relationship to the given factual situation. 
Thus, this principle is stated in the popular47 Second Restatement with 
respect to the choice-of-law rule for torts: 
 
The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are 
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, 
has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties 
under the principles stated in § 6.48 
 
Similarly, the Second Restatement’s choice-of-law rules for contract,49 
unjust enrichment,50 movable property,51 and family law52 are formulated in 
a substantially identical way. Aside from the subordination to section 6’s 
organizing principles, such as Brainerd Currie’s interest analysis53 as well 
other considerations,54 CBP willingly adopts these general tort, contract, 
unjust enrichment, family law, and property choice-of-law rules. The quest 
for the “most significant relationship” signifies precisely the above-
presented notion of juridical imposition, under which united choice is 
imposed on the parties through analysis of their external voluntary acts. 
Furthermore, the word “occurrence” (or “transaction” in the context of the 
contract law category55) relates to the parties, too. Because of the Kantian 
relational structure of private-law categories, the “occurrence” represents a 
relational aspect of parties’ interaction and inherently links the parties in a 
bipolar structure. 
It should be noted that the MSR principle is not restricted to the 
American legal system; it also has a solid basis in other jurisdictions’ 
 
 47.  On the centrality of the Second Restatement in United States daily choice-of-law practice, 
see, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, A New Conflicts Restatement: Why Not?, 5 J. PRIV. INT. L. 383, 393 
(2009). 
 48.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (1971) (emphasis added). 
 49.  Id. §§ 188(1), 189-197. 
 50.  Id. § 221(1). 
 51.  Id. §§ 222, 244, 250-251. 
 52.  Id. §§ 154, 283(1), 284, 287(1), 288. 
 53.  Id. § 6(2)(b) (referring to “relevant policies of the forum”) and § 6(2)(c) (referring to the 
“relevant policies of other interested states”); Kurt G. Siehr, Domestic Relations in Europe: European 
Equivalents to American Evolutions, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 37, 40–46 (1982) (discussing the similarity 
between § 6 and Currie’s interest analysis). 
 54.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2). 
 55. See id. § 188. 
PEARI MACRO FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2013  2:58 PM 
488 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 23:477 
choice-of-law traditions. For example, the default rule of Article 12 (2) of 
the now-abolished Private International Law Act56 referred to the 
“significance of factors”57 in the tort law area. Similarly, the general rule of 
Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation refers to “all the circumstances of 
the case [indicating] that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely 
connected” with respect to the tort law and unjust enrichment categories.58 
What is, however, the operational mechanism of the Doctrine of 
Constructive Inference? The notions of juridical indicators and juridical 
presuppositions are accessory tools of the doctrine, which facilitate its 
operation. The following two sections elaborate on this matter. 
2. Juridical Indicators 
Any external action of the parties can be considered a legitimate 
indicator of the parties’ united choice. Connecting factors such as the 
parties’ habitual residence,59 the place of injury,60 the place of 
contracting,61 the place of performance,62 the place of the business,63 the 
place of enrichment,64 or even nationality,65 are all potentially relevant to 
the parties’ united choice with respect to the law to be applied to their 
dispute. By always referring to the factors that affect both the plaintiff and 
the defendant, the Second Restatement incorporates a strictly interpersonal 
conception of the private-law categories: tort, contract, movable property, 
unjust enrichment and family law. I label these connecting factors juridical 
indicators. The contemporary international order comprised of sovereign 
states with defined territories explains the territorial nature of juridical 
 
 56.  Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995, c. 42 (U.K.) [hereinafter PIL 
Act]. 
 57.  The unlimited list of these factors included “factors relating to the parties, to any of the events 
which constitute the tort or delict in question or any of the circumstances or consequences of those 
events. 
 Id. § 12(2). 
 58.  Rome II Regulation, supra note 33, art. 4(3).  See generally Richard Fentiman, The 
Significance of Close Connection, in THE ROME II REGULATION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO NON-
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 85 (John Ahern & William Binchy eds., 2009). 
 59.  Rome II Regulation, supra note 33, arts. 4(2), 10(2). For views supporting the concept of 
domicile as ultimately grounded on a person’s choice, see e.g., CARL LUDWIG VON BAR, THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 112—15 (G.R. Gillespie trans., 2d ed.1889); JOHN 
WESTLAKE, TREATISE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 304 (1859). 
 60.  Rome II Regulation, supra note 33, art. 4(1); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 145(2)(a); PIL Act, supra note 56, art. 11(2)(a). 
 61.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2)(a). 
 62.  Id. § 188(2)(c). 
 63.  Id. §§ 145(2)(c),188(2)(e). 
 64.  Id. § 221(2)(c); Rome II Regulation, supra note 33, art. 10(3). 
 65.  Id. §§ 145(2)(c), 188(2)(e). 
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indicators. Since each territory is governed by its respective positive laws, 
the choice of a territory becomes a choice of positive law.66 
The inherent territorial nature of juridical indicators explains why 
CBP unequivocally rejects the conceptual distinction in choice-of-law 
literature and judicial decisions between so-called “territoriality factors” 
(which refer to such factors as place of transaction and place of injury) and 
“personality factors” (which refer to such factors as domicile and place of 
business).67 The events comprising the structures of private-law categories 
(such as injury, wrong, transaction, or enrichment) mimic the strictly 
relational character of private-law interaction. In this way, the connecting 
factors from the “territoriality” category link themselves to the parties, and 
together with connecting factors from the “personality” category, they 
constitute the pool of juridical indicators. These juridical indicators enable 
judicial authority to ascertain the parties’ united choice with respect to a 
specific territory and its positive law. In other words, both categories—
”territorial” and “personality”—are in fact territorial;68 they simply 
represent different sides of the same coin of the normative structure of 
choice-of-law.69 
This unified normative basis of connecting factors also answers the 
criticism of the MSR principle’s flexibility. Since this principle  counts and 
weighs connecting factors, it has been accused of causing the great 
 
 66.  This notion of the inherently territorial nature of juridical indicators sheds light on the place 
of “nationality” connecting factor within the CBP. This connecting factor, being inherently related to a 
state’s activity and the notion of citizenship, plays a much less central role for CBP than the territorial 
factors. Accordingly, it would be normatively relevant only to the extent it indicates the identity of the 
framework that the persons chose to adjudicate their dispute. 
 67.  See generally SYMEON C.SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 123—140 (2006) [hereinafter SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION]; Symeon C. 
Symeonides, Territoriality and Personality in Tort Conflicts, in INTERCONTINENTAL COOPERATION 
THROUGH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PETER E. NYGH 401 (Talia Einhorn 
& Kurt Siehr eds., 2004). 
 68.  For somewhat related comments on the “territoriality”/”personality” distinction, see Ralf 
Michaels, Globalizing Savigny? The State in Savigny’s Private International Law and the Challenge 
from  Europeanization and Globalization, in  AKTUELLE FRAGEN ZU POLITISCHER UND RECHTLICHER 
STEUERUNG IM KONTEXT DER GLOBALISIERUNG 119, 134 (Michael Stolleis & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 
2007); Reimann, supra note 30 at 590. 
 69.  Accordingly, CBP is at odds with William Reppy’s principal objection to different 
combinations between methods of (1) “territoriality”, (2) “personality” and (2) “better law”. Reppy 
labels this combination of methods as “eclecticism”. See generally William A. Reppy. Jr., Eclecticism 
in Methods for Resolving Tort and Contract Conflict of Laws: The United States and the European 
Union, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2053 (2008).  Ironically, but as a combination of the three methods, CBP 
generally supports this “eclecticism”. Under this approach the “territoriality” and “personality” 
categories are normatively unified. Furthermore, as we will see in the next section of this Article, under 
the notion of the Innate Right Test of Legality, a restricted version of the “better law” theory is 
integrated into the normative structure of the choice-of-law question. 
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unpredictability of the Second Restatement in its implementation.70 The 
MSR principle has been mocked as being a “no rules approach”71 or 
“unabashedly open-ended.”72 As Friedrich Juenger sarcastically put it, “But 
even a juggler, not to mention a trial judge, can only cope with a finite 
number of balls in the air.”73 The above-presented account of juridical 
indicators sheds light on this objection. Any external action of the parties 
can be considered a legitimate indicator with respect to the juridical 
meaning of the interaction. Accordingly, the flexibility of the MSR 
principle reflects its normative significance, rather than any doctrinal 
deficiency. 
Furthermore, the matter of the flexibility of the MSR principle 
deserves special attention for CBP. Although this perspective does not 
restrict the potential pool of juridical indicators, it is crucial for CBP that 
all indicators be directly related to the private law structures of liability. 
This requirement is based on the very relational nature of the notion of 
united choice as a fundamental principle of the choice-of-law question. 
This choice is about a framework that will determine parties’ rights and 
duties with respect to certain private-law categories: contract, tort, unjust 
enrichment, movable property, family law. Accordingly, choice has to be 
related to these categories. Thus, for example, in the case of tort law, the 
indicators of the parties’ domicile, the place of permanent business, and so 
on, have to be assessed at the time of the tort.  Accordingly, the indicator of 
the place of the forum, for instance, offered by some commentators,74 must 
be rejected as normatively defective because it bears no relation to the tort 
that forms the party’s interaction. 
Indeed, due to the potential multiplicity of relevant juridical 
indicators, the process of providing juridical meaning to the parties’ 
external actions is not an easy one.75 The era of the Internet and people’s 
 
 70.  See e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, “At Least, To Do No Harm”: Does the Second Restatement of 
Conflicts Meet the Hippocratic Standard?, 56 MD. L. REV. 1284, 1288-89 (1997); Kermit Roosevelt III, 
The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2466.  For a recent objection 
to the alleged unpredictability of the Second Restatement, see Whytock, supra note 23, at 745-76. 
 71.  Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 377, 381 (1966). 
 72.  Laura E. Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in Conflict of Laws: The Paradox of Formalism, 
37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 925, 958 (2004). 
 73.  Friedrich K. Juenger, The E.E.C. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations: An American Assessment, in CONTRACT CONFLICTS 295, 300 (P.M. North ed., 1982). 
 74.  See e.g., CURRIE, supra note 6, at 141. For a related discussion, albeit in the context of 
jurisdictional rules, see Mills, supra note 14 at 237 (distinguishing between the “time of proceedings” 
and the “time of event related to the dispute”). 
 75.  For examples of the operational mechanics of juridical indicators, see WEINRIB, supra note 
27, at 34-43; Peari, supra note 27, at 154-61. 
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increased mobility add much complexity to this task. However, hard cases 
will always remain hard cases.76 All relevant juridical indicators must be 
taken into consideration and systematically evaluated in accordance with 
their juridical significance. As the Second Restatement states: “These 
contacts [juridical indicators] are to be evaluated according to their relative 
importance with respect to the particular issue.”77 
Furthermore, for the CBP of choice-of-law, juridical indicators are 
not the beginning of the story. The next section presents the other accessory 
tool in the operational mechanism of the Doctrine of Constructive 
Inference—the notion of juridical presuppositions. 
3. Juridical Presuppositions 
By analyzing the internal structures of each of the private-law 
categories, CBP purports to deduce a connecting factor that is presumed to 
reflect the parties’ united choice of law for adjudicating their private-law 
interaction. This connecting factor serves for CBP as a starting point for 
further evaluation of juridical indicators. I label these categories’ structural 
points of departure “juridical presuppositions.” 
Let me demonstrate this argument through the category of contract 
law. As with other private-law categories, the Kantian legal philosophy 
conceives of this category as strictly relational, that is, as a relation 
between two persons.78 Within this relation, the Kantian conception of the 
 
 76.  Savigny many years ago recognized the great complexity of certain situations.  Thus, he calls 
the case of a contract concluded by correspondence as a “most doubtful and disputed case”. SAVIGNY, 
supra note 41, at 230. 
 77.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145(2), 188(2), 221(2). This exposition 
of the flexible nature of juridical indicators pre-empts the possibility of challenging CBP based on the 
objections that have been raised by Lea Brilmayer against the notion of tacit consent. By invoking the 
case of a person’s accidental physical presence in a state’s territory, Brilmayer has reached the 
conclusion that the notion of tacit consent cannot be perceived as a consensual submission. Lea 
Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN L. REV. 1, 6-10 (1989) [hereinafter Brilmayer, 
Consent]; Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice-of-law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1304 (1989) 
[hereinafter Brilmayer, Rights]). Accordingly, Brilmayer mocks the doctrine of tacit consent as “purely 
fictional” and declares it to be not applicable to the choice-of-law question. Id. at 1303. This objection, 
however, fails to undermine CBP’s notion of juridical indicators. Indeed, the circumstances in which a 
person’s domicile does not shed light on a person’s choice do exist, but they are simply irrelevant for 
CBP’s notion of juridical indicators, which by its nature integrates a broad spectrum of relevant factors 
that are evaluated according to their relative significance. Furthermore, the notion of juridical indicators 
is also immune from the “fiction” charge. In fact, this is exactly CBP’s understanding of the above-
presented Doctrine of Constructive Inference according to which the judge imposes on the parties the 
juridical meaning of their voluntary external actions. This is indeed fiction, but as Brilmayer herself 
admits elsewhere, this is a legal fiction. See Brilmayer, Consent, supra, at 7 (emphasis not in original). 
For discussion of the central role of “legal fictions” under the Neo-Kantian theory of private law, see 
WEINRIB, THE IDEA, supra note 5, at 177-96. 
 78.  For an alternative conception of contractual entitlement as a relation between a person and 
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nature of contractual entitlement inherently focuses on the performance of 
the contract. Under this conception, by signing a contract, a person does not 
acquire a right to the item bargained for, but rather acquires a right merely 
to the performance of the promised act.79 Thus, for example, if I agree with 
my neighbor to buy his horse, the signing of the contract itself does not 
mean that the horse is already mine. By making a contract with my 
neighbor I acquire merely a right to require my neighbor to perform his 
obligation—to deliver the horse. However, the horse continues to belong to 
my neighbor until the actual performance of the obligation—the actual 
transfer of the horse to me.80 
Since the property transfer occurs not at the time of signing a contract, 
but rather at the time of performance itself, this concept of contractual 
entitlement shifts the focus from the act of signing the contract, to 
performance of the contract itself, as the essential element of this private-
law category. In this way, the place of performance, localized at this 
essential element, establishes a juridical presupposition for ascertaining the 
parties’ united choice. However, the place of performance provides only 
the starting point for judicial analysis, and other juridical indicators such as 
place of business, domicile, place of contracting, presumed doctrine of 
validity of contract,81 and so forth have to be considered and balanced.82 
The same point follows from a neo-Kantian analysis of other private-
law categories. Thus, by focusing on the concept of transition of value, the 
neo-Kantian understanding of the law of unjust enrichment points to the 
 
thing, see the Hegelian conception of contract law as a relation between the person and thing. G.W.F. 
HEGEL, OUTLINES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 84-92 (T.M. Knox, trans. 2008) (1952). See also 
Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel 
and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077 (1989). 
 79.   KANT, DOCTRINE OF RIGHT, supra note 4, at [6:273]. For a detailed discussion of the 
Kantian exposition of contractual entitlement with further important implications for the nature of 
contractual damages, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 55, 65-70 (2003); RIPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 69-70. 
 80.  As Weinrib explains “[W]hat the promisee acquires through a contract is not a right to a thing 
but a right against the specific person obligated to perform the requisite act.” Weinrib, supra note 79, at 
67 (reference omitted). 
 81.  For an exposition of the presumed validity of contract doctrine as fundamentally related to the 
parties’ presumed choice (and therefore fully consistent with CBP), see Nygh, supra note 44, at 338-40. 
 82.  This approach seemed to be mentioned in a footnote by the translator of Savigny’s work on 
choice-of-law, William Guthrie, who introduced the traditional English contract choice-of-law rule in 
the following terms: “No doubt there are cases where the place of contracting is of importance, but 
generally the place of performing is of more.” This statement seems to accept the place of fulfillment of 
the contractual obligation as a juridical presupposition, but it does not disqualify in advance the 
significance of the place of contracting as a relevant juridical indicator. See SAVIGNY, supra note 41, at 
228 (emphasis not in original). 
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place of enrichment as the juridical presupposition of this category.83 
Similar analyses of the movable property and tort law categories 
establishes the juridical presuppositions of the place of property and the 
place of the wrongful conduct,84 respectively, as the most central elements 
in the internal structures of these private-law categories. Under this 
exposition of the relationships between juridical presuppositions and 
juridical indicators, juridical presuppositions are not “fixed,” but rather 
present “loose” starting positions that can be overturned by the relevant 
juridical indicators of the particular circumstances.85 
The relation proposed here between juridical presuppositions and 
juridical indicators can also be traced in contemporary choice-of-law 
provisions and judicial decisions. Among them the following examples can 
be mentioned: the traditional common law approach that has viewed the 
place of enrichment as a point of departure for choice-of-law analysis of 
the law of unjust enrichment,86 the preliminary tort choice-of-law rule 
under the abolished PIL Act,87  the preliminary tort and unjust enrichment 
choice-of-law rules of the Rome II Regulation,88 and various provisions of 
the Second Restatement.89 
Furthermore, the notions of juridical presuppositions and juridical 
indicators also insulate CBP from the objections raised by legal realists 
against Joseph Beale’s version of “vested rights” theory, which was 
eventually destroyed by those objections.90 CBP seems to obstruct at least 
 
 83. Weinrib, supra note 27; Peari, supra note 27. 
 84.  CBP supports the juridical presupposition of the place of wrongful conduct (rather than the 
place of injury) as the most central element of the structure of tort law. For the central role of the 
wrongful conduct element within Neo-Kantian conceptions of tort law structures of liability, see Arthur 
Ripstein, Civil Recourse and Separation of Wrongs and Remedies, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 163 (2012); 
WEINRIB, THE IDEA, supra note 5, at 38-40, 143-203. 
 85.  This was precisely Joachim Zekoll’s response to Juenger’s criticism of the apparently 
inherent flexibility of the MSR principle. Zekoll argues that Juenger’s argument ignores the rooted 
European and American tradition of so-called “soft connecting factors” that can be overturned by other 
connecting factors. See Joachim Zekoll, A Review of Choice of Law and Multistate Justice, in 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS FOR THE THIRD MILLENNIUM 9, 14 (Patrick J. Borchers & Joachim 
Zekoll eds., 2001). 
 86.  See e.g., George Panagopoulos, RESTITUTION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 111-31 
(2000); see also Robert Leslie, Unjustified Enrichment in the Conflict of Law, 2 EDIN. L.R. 233, 235-41 
(defending the unjust enrichment choice-of-law rule that combines the place of enrichment and the 
MSR principle). 
 87.  PIL Act, supra note 56, art. 11(1). 
 88.  Rome II Regulation, supra note 33, arts. 4(1); 10(3). 
 89.  See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (establishing a preliminary 
point of departure in the area of tort law); id. § 191 (establishing a preliminary point of departure in the 
area of contract law). 
 90.  For a discussion of the realists’ exceptionally successful attack on Beale’s version of vested 
PEARI MACRO FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2013  2:58 PM 
494 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 23:477 
two (out of three91) of the realists’ principal objections.  First, CBP is 
immune from the so-called “mechanical” or “arbitrary” claim of Beale’s 
theory. The legal realists criticized the “mechanical method” of this theory 
under which choice-of-law follows strictly the application of the single 
connecting factor of the last event.92 On the contrary, there is nothing 
mechanical or arbitrary in CBP. It does not strictly follow the application of 
a pre-determined (and often arbitrary) connecting factor of vested rights 
theory, but rather involves a complex adjudicative process of analyzing and 
weighing the relevant juridical presupposition and juridical indicators. 
Second, CBP is also immune from the legal realists’ other claim, 
which challenged the coherency of Beale’s argument. The realists have 
demonstrated the flawed internal logic in the vested rights theory’s view of 
the court as a mere enforcer of a pre-existing right of the plaintiff.93 CBP’s 
conception of the choice-of-law question, on the contrary, actually follows 
the realists in holding that the plaintiff’s right does not exist until it is 
promulgated by the court.94 As we have seen, the state does not disappear 
under CBP.95 CBP inherently assigns to the state’s public institution, 
judicial authority, a crucial role through which the court systematically 
evaluates persons’ external voluntary acts and gives them juridical 
meaning. In contrast to Beale, who viewed judges as bureaucrats enforcing 
the law of the last event,96 for CBP, the plaintiff’s right cannot exist 
without public judicial authority. 
 
rights theory, see SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 67, at 11-13; Brilmayer, Rights, supra note 
77, at 1281-91. 
 91.  The legal realists’ third objection challenged in principle any conceptual understanding of the 
choice-of-law question. See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 4, 8, 15 (1942); see also ERNEST G. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1947). 
 92.  Thus, Cook coined Beale’s last event connecting factor as a ‘practical rule’ (COOK, supra note 
91, at 45) and mocked the arbitrary connecting factor of the place of injury in the tort law category (Ibid 
at 17, 203). For related objections to vested rights theory, see CURRIE, supra note 6, at 138-39 
(mentioning the ‘machinery’ operation of this theory). 
 93.  See COOK, supra note 91, at 20-25. For a recent restatement of this argument, see Kermit 
Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence By Means of Language, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1821, 1830-36 (2004). 
 94.  COOK, supra note 91, at 29-33. 
 95.  See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
 96.  BEALE, supra note 15, § 4.6, at 38-39. As Perry Dane commented on the role of judicial 
authority under Beale’s theory the distinctiveness of Beale’s approach according to which rights are 
created under the time of the occurrence of facts rather than the rights created at the time of litigation. 
See Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L. J. 1191, 1195 (1987) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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C. Innate Right Test of Legality 
The exposition of the CBP of choice-of-law is not complete without 
its final foundational block. This block addresses the Kantian justification 
for the positivity of laws and the resulting substantive restriction on that 
positivity. 
The Kantian position on this matter can be stated as follows: within 
the regime of purely private rights called the “State of Nature”, Kant makes 
a conceptual division between two types of individual rights: the “Innate 
Right” and “Acquired Rights”. The Innate Right is the inherent entitlement 
that every person has by virtue of his birth.97 Innate equality, the 
presumption of innocence, freedom of expression, and freedom of belief 
are among the constituents of this right that Kant specifies. Acquired 
Rights, on the other hand, refer to an individual’s capacity to acquire 
objects external to them.98 Property rights and contractual rights are 
representative examples of such rights. 
In contrast to the Innate Right, the normative structures of Acquired 
Rights are so obscure and indeterminate that they are perceived as 
provisional, rather than conclusive, in nature.99 This provisional nature of 
Acquired Rights leads to the imperative to leave the regime of purely 
private rights in favor of establishing sovereign states and public legal 
institutions that will guarantee the regime of property entitlements (or, as 
Kant refers to it, the “Rightful Condition”).100 In this way, the public legal 
institutions that create law (the legislative branch), apply law (the judicial 
branch), and enforce law (the executive branch) are ultimately justified by 
the indeterminacy of Acquired Rights in the State of Nature.101 
 
 97.  KANT, DOCTRINE OF RIGHT, supra note 4, [6:237-6:238]. 
 98.  Id. [6:245-6:6:252]. Accordingly, the Kantian concept of Acquired Rights should not be 
confused with the terminologically identical concept of “acquired rights” that is frequently used in 
choice-of-law literature in the context of rights “acquired” under foreign laws that domestic courts 
enforce. Since Kantian Acquired Rights relate to the rights that the individuals have with respect to 
objects external to them in the regime of purely private rights, they have nothing to do with the 
existence of sovereign states and enforcement of their positive law provisions in domestic courts. 
 99.  For accounts supporting this understanding of the contrast between Innate Right and Acquired 
Rights, see Weinrib, System of Rights, supra note 38, at 808; RIPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 177. 
 100.  KANT, DOCTRINE OF RIGHT, supra note 4, [6:313]. 
 101.  Accordingly, these basic features of the Kantian concept of the State of Nature would be at 
odds with two recent attempts to base the “Neo-Kantian” understanding of choice-of-law on the 
extension of the State of Nature concept to private international interaction. See Gian Paolo Romano, Le 
Droit International Privé à l’épreuve de la Théorie Kantienne de la Justice, 1 JOURNAL DU DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL 59 (2012); Florian Rödl, Weltbürgerliches Kollisionsrecht, ÜBER DIE FORM DES 
KOLLISIONSRECHTS UND SEINE GESTALT IM RECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION (2008). In contrast to 
these accounts, the Kantian State of Nature fundamentally addresses the regime of natural Acquired 
Rights with a further transition to the regime of international order consisting of independent states with 
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Because the imperative to leave the State of Nature in favor of the 
Rightful Condition is imperative, Kant supports a minimal model of the 
states’ order.102 In this model, all states with their public institutions have to 
be viewed equally, regardless of their internal approximation towards the 
Kantian ideal of a republican state.103 Therefore, no distinction is made 
between the positive-law provisions of liberal democratic states and 
corrupted states that do not even have a clear separation of powers. Since 
for Kant all positive laws are normatively equal, no additional inquiry is 
needed to decide whether a given law is more or less approximate to Kant’s 
natural rights theory. 
Had it stopped at this point, this account would have collapsed into the 
classical positivist approach according to which legality is grounded solely 
on the authoritative act of appropriate authority. However, this is not the 
Kantian view. In fundamental contrast to the classical positivist approach, 
Kant provides a normative justification for the laws’ positivity. The 
motivation behind the imperative to establish modern states with their legal 
public institutions was driven by the defects in the State of Nature. 
However, these defects are related to Acquired Rights, not to the Innate 
Right. This explains why the Innate Right survives the transition to the 
Rightful Condition and why a legislative provision that does not respect the 
Innate Right is not a positive provision at all.104  In other words, for Kant, 
all positive laws are normatively equal, subject to passing the fundamental 
precondition of the Innate Right Test of Legality [“IRTL”].105 
 
public legal institutions. 
 102.   Kant seems to identify certain extreme situations in which the individuals did not even enter 
into the Rightful Condition. Accordingly the most horrible and barbaric regimes cannot, for Kant, be 
regarded as states. See IMMANUEL KANT, ANTHROPOLOGY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW [7:330] 
(Robert Louden trans., 2006) (1798). 
 103.   KANT, DOCTRINE OF RIGHT, supra note 4, [6:340- 6:341]; see Garrett W. Brown, State 
Sovereignty, Federation and Kantian Cosmopolitanism, 11 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 495, 505 (2005) 
 104.   For a natural law tradition that supports this position under which highly unjust positive 
provisions cannot be counted as “law”, see Gustav Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-
Statutory Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (Bonne Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., 
2006) (1946); Gustav Radbruch, Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 13 
(Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., 2006) (1945); ROBERT ALEXY, THE 
ARGUMENT FROM INJUSTICE: A REPLY TO LEGAL POSITIVISM (Stanley L. Paulson & Bonnie 
Litschewski Paulson  trans., 2002); SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 23, n.23 (2011). 
 105.  The argument in this and the previous three paragraphs is drawn from my interpretation of 
Kantian legal positivism. This understanding differs from the well-known Jeremy Waldron treatment of 
this issue, Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism,109 HARV. L. REV. 1535 (1996); JEREMY 
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999), where Waldron attributes to Kant the classical positivist 
position according to which the fundamental test of legality is solely grounded on the authoritative act 
of appropriate authority. My view is different. If anything, this view relates to Perry Dane’s recent 
comments regarding the possible relation between normativity, positivity and choice-of-law, where 
Dane seems to argue that natural law provides at the same time a basis for both: (1) justification of legal 
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In modern choice-of-law terminology, the IRTL (which is 
subsequently important for the private international law component of 
“equal treatment”106) can be traced across a wide spectrum of subjects, 
doctrines, and concepts appearing in choice-of-law literature under 
different names: “limitations on the parties’ autonomy principle,”107  the 
“public policy exception,”108 the “fundamental public policy exception,”109 
“mandatory rules,”110 “rules of immediate application,”111 “human 
rights,”112 “supranational human rights,”113 or “constitutional 
constraints.”114 Despite the myriad names, the CBP insists on a single 
unifying basis for understanding these subjects, doctrines, and concepts.115 
Under this understanding, the IRTL inheres in the choice-of-law process 
itself and provides the ultimate normative justification for the wide range of 
 
positivism; and (2) an exception to legal positivism in radically “unjust” cases. See Perry Dane, The 
Natural Law Challenge to Choice of Law, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 142, 170-75 
(Donald E. Childress ed., 2012). 
 106.  See, e.g., R.H. Graveson, Philosophical Aspects of the English Conflict of Laws, 78 LAW  Q. 
REV. 337, 361 (1962); Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 
COLUM. L. REV. 959, 963 (1952); Roosevelt, supra note 71, at 2517 (“equality of treatment under 
conflict rules is clearly fundamental”).  Accordingly the whole methodology of interest analysis seems 
to be ruled out by CBP as inherently discriminatory against non-residents. For discussion on this feature 
of interest analysis, see Roosevelt, supra note 70, at 2481, 2500; Brilmayer, Rights, supra note 77, at 
1315. 
 107.  Both American and European systems tend to intervene in the parties’ choice under the 
parties’ autonomy principle in the case of inherently asymmetrical relationships between the parties. 
Among these special provisions are mandatory consumer, employment and insurance contract 
requirements, see Rühl, supra note 39, at 167–175; Borchers, supra note 30, at 1657–59 and the weaker 
party protection provisions of ex-ante agreements in the area of tort law under the Rome II Regulation, 
see Rome II Regulation, supra note 33, Art. 14(1)(b). 
 108.  Accordingly, CBP conceives the doctrine of public policy as an establishment of a minimal 
substantive threshold for the ordinary choice-of-law process, which is unrelated to any particular 
policy-based analysis of a particular state. For conceptions of public policy doctrine formulated in 
somewhat related terms, see JUENGER, supra note 12, at 199 (coining the doctrine as of “last resort”); 
Cheatham & Reese, supra note 106, at 980 (referring to the doctrine as “dragging on the coat tails of 
civilization”). 
 109.  See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 30, at 1652. 
 110.  Id. at 1651–57; Rome II Regulation, supra note 33, Art. 16. 
 111.  See, e.g.,  Symeon C. Symeonides, American Choice of Law at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 
37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2000) (defining “rules of immediate application” as “substantive 
rules of law which are intended to apply to multistate cases ‘immediately’ or ‘directly’ in the sense of 
bypassing the ordinary choice-of-law rules”). 
 112.   See, e.g., Adrian Briggs, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 232 (2nd ed. 2008). 
 113.   Ralf Michaels, Public and Private International Law: German Views on Global Issues, J. 
PRIVATE INT’L. L. 121, 131 (2008) [hereinafter Michaels, German Views]. For further discussion on the 
notion of human rights as a reflection of IRTL, see infra notes 126–32 and accompanying text. 
 114.   Roosevelt, supra note 70, at 2507–34. 
 115.  See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 30, at 1651–52 (substantially equating the American use of the 
term “public policy” and the European term “mandatory rules”). 
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exceptions to the application of choice-of-law rules. The authoritative acts 
of those states that do not meet the substantive requirement of Kantian 
Innate Right are disqualified from this process and cannot in principle serve 
as an object of persons’ united choice. 
III. THE OPERATIONAL FORCE OF CBP: SEVERAL EXAMPLES 
I would like to demonstrate the operational force of CBP through 
several examples. Consider the following situation. If my neighbor and I 
were to have a dispute about whether I should compensate him or her for 
the full cost of our shared fence that he or she just built, could we agree that 
the dispute between us would be governed by the applicable Jewish law 
provision of unjust enrichment rather than the alternative state law 
provision? In other words, can we, in contract law, tort law, unjust 
enrichment, family law, or property law cases, provide our own, 
autonomous and non-state substantive framework for deciding our 
disputes? 
CBP would treat the case in the following manner. Jewish law offers 
coherent and comprehensive conceptions of the law of unjust enrichment in 
general, and the matter of shared fences in particular, which in some ways 
relates to, and in other ways departs from, the contemporary common law 
understanding of the subject.116 Accordingly, it meets the above-mentioned 
“specificity requirement” that CBP imposes on the parties’ autonomy 
principle.117 Furthermore, since the three foundational blocks of CBP 
together always influence the choice-of-law process and operate to 
different degrees and on different levels depending on the particular 
circumstances of the case, CBP imposes several additional restrictions on 
the parties’ potential choice. The IRTL imposes on the choice-of-law 
process the value of “equality” according to which individuals are treated 
equally before the law regardless of race, gender, religion, and so on. 
Accordingly, CBP would disqualify the application of a Jewish law 
provision of unjust enrichment that would grant a certain advantage to my 
neighbor merely because he is not Jewish or because of his gender.118 
Furthermore, the influence of the Doctrine of Constructive Inference and 
 
 116.  For a helpful discussion of these issues, see, Ernest J. Weinrib, Planting Another’s Field: 
Unrequested Improvements Under Jewish Law, in UNDERSTANDING UNJUST ENRICHMENT 221 (Jason 
Neyers, Mitchell McInnes & Stephen G.A. Pitel eds., 2004). 
 117.  See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
 118.  On the discriminatory nature of Jewish law private law provisions against foreigners, see  
David Wermuth, Human Rights in Jewish Law: Contemporary Juristic and Rabbinic Conceptions, 32 
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1101 (2011). For an attempt to reconcile Jewish law discriminatory provisions in light 
of contemporary reality, see HAIM H. COHN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN JEWISH LAW (1984). 
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the MSR principle gives rise to an additional limitation: this choice of 
Jewish law has to be to a certain degree objectively related to the parties. In 
this way CBP follows contemporary American doctrines limiting the 
parties´ autonomy principle: (1) the requirement of certain reasonable 
connection of the parties to the chosen law; and (2) the exception of 
vulnerable party cases, such as consumer and employee contracts.119 
The other two examples are from perhaps the most significant tort law 
choice-of-law decisions of the last century: the American Babcock v. 
Jackson120 and English Chaplin v. Boys.121 Babcock v. Jackson involved a 
tort between two New York residents during their short trip to Ontario. 
Despite CBP’s juridical presupposition to apply the law of the place he 
place of wrongful conduct, an analysis of all the other juridical indicators 
pointed to the juridical imposition of New York’s negligence law as 
reflecting the parties’ united choice with respect to the framework for 
determination of their rights and duties. At this point, the question of the 
so-called reverse-Babcock case arises, in which an accident occurs in New 
York between Ontario residents. Apparently, a similar MSR analysis 
purports to support the application of Ontario’s negligence law. However, 
this would ignore the IRTL. Since Ontario’s negligence law of that time 
discriminated against foreign residents in favor of local residents,122 this 
law infringes the equality of the parties and consequently is inconsistent 
with the IRTL. Therefore, despite the fact that juridical indicators pointed to 
Ontario’s law, the substantive evaluation of this law disqualifies it from the 
pool of legitimate provisions from which the parties’ united choice can be 
inferred. From this perspective, the application of the New York negligence 
law remains in the reverse-Babcock case. 
On the other hand, Chaplin v. Boys represents a case where the 
content of the applied law passes the IRTL. In this case, a tort had been 
committed between two English soldiers during their military service in 
Malta. Despite the juridical presupposition of the place of wrongful 
conduct, the juridical indicators of the parties’ permanent domiciles and the 
 
 119.  For a recent discussion of the two limitations that American doctrine imposes on the parties’ 
autonomy principle, see Rühl, supra note 39, at 155-176, and Symeonides, supra note 39. 
 120.  Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473 (1963). For a discussion on the influence that this case 
has exercised on American choice-of-law thinking, see SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 68, at 
106-114. 
 121.  Chaplin v. Boys [1971] A.C. 356. For a discussion on the significance of this case for English 
tort choice-of-law rules, see CLARKSON & HILL, supra note 20, at 292 (“The common law choice of law 
rules comprise a general rule and an exception. The leading authority is the decision of the House of 
Lords in Boys v. Chaplin.”). 
 122.  For a discussion on this point see Donald T. Trautman, A Comment, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 465 
(1967), and Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 133 (1972) (Bergan, J., dissenting). 
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arbitrary nature of the place of military service123 point to the application of 
English negligence law. However, in contrast to Babcock v. Jackson, both 
of the relevant positive provisions in this case pass the IRTL. Although, 
according to the House of Lords’ opinion, the Maltese law clearly 
undercompensated the plaintiff,124 this fact is irrelevant for the IRTL. As 
long as the equality between the parties is preserved, the CBP treats both 
positive law provisions equally, regardless of their approximation to 
Kantian natural law philosophy. Accordingly, in the reverse-Chaplin case 
(where a tort had been committed between two Maltese servants during 
their service in England) the Maltese tort law would apply.125 
The last example I would like to refer to is the well-known notion of 
international human rights as a reflection of IRTL. The IRTL sheds light on 
the conceptual location of this notion. Recognized in a series of 
international conventions,126 the universalistic aspirations of human rights 
have acquired a significant role in contemporary legal scholarship.127 
Through the notion of the IRTL and its independence from Law of Nation 
considerations,128 CBP rejects any relation to public international law or 
international relationships. Therefore, despite the current tendency of 
academic literature,129 CBP perceives international human rights as an 
inherently internal component of the choice-of-law process itself. This 
“private international law” classification of international human rights has a 
direct influence on several related matters. First, CBP denies the common 
 
 123.  See SAVIGNY, supra note 41, at 103-104 (eliminating the discussion on the arbitrary nature of 
military service as vitiating a person’s choice with respect to the identity of the applied law). 
 124.   Chaplin, [1971] A.C. 356 at 380 (Lord Guest), 373 (Lord Hodson), 384 (Lord Wilberforce), 
393 (Lord Pearson). 
 125.  This point demonstrates the conceptual differences between CBP and a purely better-law 
methodology. While best-law methodology is based purely on the substantive evaluation of the content 
of relevant positive provisions, the CBP rejects an overall appeal to the notion of substantive justice and 
restricts this evaluation to the IRTL. 
 126.  See Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Dec. 10 1948. G.A. Res. 217 A (III); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Sept. 3, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221. 
 127.  See e.g., JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 9-27 (2nd 
ed. 2002); Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 201, 
206-208 (1998) (discussing the natural law foundation of human rights); Michael J. Perry, Are Human 
Rights Universal? The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997) 
(defending a universalistic conception of human rights against the subjectivism of cultural relativism). 
 128.  See supra Part I. 
 129.  For an example of the protection of international human rights in public international law, see 
JOHN H. CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 412-448 (2nd ed. 2008); see also Michaels, German 
Views, supra note 114, at 133 (“Today, the site of human rights is usually sought in treaties between 
nations; this is what justifies their character as public international law.”). 
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view that private international law and public international law are linked 
through the subject of international human rights.130 Second, it rejects the 
instrumentalist conception of the choice-of-law question according to 
which choice-of-law serves as a tool for promoting human rights.131 On the 
contrary, CBP defends an internal justification of the choice-of-law 
question and as such it is purely non-instrumental. Finally, CBP rejects the 
notion that the choice-of-law question can be grounded solely on 
international human rights.132 This would disjoin the IRTL from other 
foundational blocks of CBP. Although the IRTL is not a normatively 
disconnected exception to the choice-of-law process (as it is viewed in 
current choice-of-law literature), it also is not the sole organizing principle 
of choice-of-law.  Rather, under CBP, the subject of international human 
rights (as the actualization of the IRTL) is an indispensable part of the 
normative ensemble that consists of: (1) the Parties’ Autonomy Principle; 
(2) the Doctrine of Constructive Inference; and (3) IRTL. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has presented the Choice-Based Perspective of choice-of-
law. Starting with the notion of the independence of the choice-of-law 
process from the principles of the Law of Nations, it argued that the choice-
of-law question is ultimately grounded on the idea of persons’ united 
choice with respect to the framework for adjudication of their dispute. This 
idea has been developed through three foundational blocks: (1) the Parties’ 
Autonomy Principle; (2) the Doctrine of Constructive Inference; and (3) the 
Innate Right Test of Legality. Furthermore, as it has been shown, the 
normative underpinnings of CBP are fully consistent with many traditional 
and contemporary choice-of-law rules, doctrines, and concepts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 130.  See e.g., Michaels, German Views, supra note 114, at 131. 
 131.  See e.g., Veerle Van Den Eecklhout, Promoting Human Rights within the Union: The Role of 
Private International Law, 14 ELJ 105, 111-113, 117-118 (2008). 
 132.  See e.g., Ralf Michaels, The New European Choice-of-Law Revolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1607, 
1634 (2008) (“Fundamental (or human) rights are sometimes viewed as the basis of classical conflict of 
laws . . . .”). 
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APPENDIX 
The CBP model of choice-of-law rules as presented in this Article is 
illustrated in the following chart:               
 
Choice-Based Perspective’s Model of Choice-of-Law Rules 
                 
Did the parties explicitly express their choice? 
 
 
 
 
Parties Autonomy Principle   Reasonable Connection   Doctrine of Constructive Inference                   
                                      
             
                 IRTL                                                                    
                                                         
 
                               
 
                              Classification into Private Law Categories  
    
                                           
               
 
   Property Law             Contract           Unjust Enrichment              Tort    
  
 
 
Movable    Immovable    Place of Performance   Place of Enrichment     Place of Wrong 
 
          
 
 
Place of Property          Juridical Indicators         Juridical Indicators        Juridical Indicators                    
             
 
 
Juridical Indicators                IRTL                             IRTL                          IRTL                                     
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